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Does Hot Spots Policing Inevitably Lead to
Unfair and Abusive Police Practices, or
Can We Maximize Both Fairness and
Effectiveness in the New Proactive Policing?
David Weisburdt

ABSTRACT
Hot spots policing has emerged as one of the most importantand widely diffused of
what are sometimes termed the "new policing" strategies. Such strategies were
developed in response to a critique of police effectiveness in preventing crime that
developed in the late twentieth century. While hot spots policing strategies have
been shown to be effective in preventing crime, a narrativeis developing that links
hot spotspolicing, as well as other new policing strategiesfocused on crime control,
to unfair and brutal police practices. In this paper, I examine this growing
narrative both to challenge some of its assumptions and to create a counter
narrative about how we can integrate hot spots policing with approaches that
encourage positive evaluations of police legitimacy. After reviewing the
development of hot spots policing, I show that there is little evidence that it leads to
biased or abusive policing, and indeed that the approachmore generally increases
the focus of crime prevention and thus should reduce the degree to which police
intervene in the lives of citizens across communities. At the same time, using stop,
question, and frisks in New York City as an example, I illustrate that aggressive
policing strategieslikely to lead to negative community responses can be focused on
hot spots. In concluding, I argue that we can maximize both crime control and
citizen evaluations of police legitimacy in the context of hot spots policing, and I
provide two examples of ongoing programs that attempt to achieve both of these
goals.

Narratives about what works in crime control are often as
important to how practitioners and policymakers understand "what
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they should do" as the science that such narratives draw upon. A single
narrative can shape discussions about reform. It has implications for
the types of programs that are adopted in the field, and the direction of
innovation in the future. Because narratives are so important in the
development of crime prevention programs, it is important to carefully
examine what the evidence actually says about such narratives. Below
I argue that a narrative is developing that links hot spots policing to
unfair and brutal police practices. In this paper, I want to examine this
growing narrative both to challenge some of its assumptions and to
create a counter narrative about how we can integrate hot spots
policing with approaches that encourage positive evaluations of police
legitimacy. But it is useful at the outset to consider how recent
narratives surrounding hot spots policing developed and how they
overturned earlier narratives about the ineffectiveness of police efforts
to control crime.
Robert Martinson's review of research on correctional programs,
published in 1974, began what has often been identified as the "nothing
works" narrative in crime prevention and rehabilitation.' He based his
article on a review of outcome evaluations of correctional innovations.
He asked in his article: "Do all of these studies lead us irrevocably to
the conclusion that nothing works, that we haven't the faintest clue
about how to rehabilitate offenders and reduce recidivism?" 2 While he
did not actually state that nothing works, he concluded: "With few and
isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so
far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism." 3 This nothing works
narrative became dominant in discussions of criminal justice
interventions over the next decade not only in corrections, but in other
fields as well.4 In policing, the evidence used to support a nothing

works narrative was not drawn from a systematic review of research,
but was cumulative across a few major studies.5 Evaluations of key
police prevention approaches, such as "routine preventive patrol"6 and

&

1 See DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., WHAT WORKS IN CRIME PREVENTION AND REHABILITATION:
LESSONS FROM SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS (Springer 2016) (discussing the importance of narrative in
crime prevention); Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers about PrisonReform,
35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974).
2 Id. at 48.
Id. at 25.
4
See generally Christy A. Visher & David Weisburd, Identifying What Works: Recent Trends
in Crime Prevention Strategies, 28 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 223, 226-28 (1997).
6 See David Weisburd & Anthony A. Braga, Hot Spots Policing as a Model for Police
Innovation, in POLICE INNOVATION: CONTRASTING PERSPECTIVES 225, 225-29 (David Weisburd
Anthony A. Braga eds., 2006).
6 See GEORGE L. KELLING ET AL., THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT: A
SUMMARY REPORT 7 (Police Found. 1974) (defining routine preventive control as the time on-duty
officers spend not responding to calls but instead engaging in self-initiated pursuits, including
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"rapid response to citizen calls for service," 7 suggested that these
programs did little to reduce crime. By the early 1990s, David Bayley
could argue with confidence that "[t]he police do not prevent crime."8
While the narrative that "nothing works" gained wide acceptance,
some scholars began, almost from the outset, to question the broad
scope of conclusions that Martinson and others had reached. In an
early criticism, Ted Palmer argued that Martinson had overlooked
many positive findings in his review to come to a strong general
statement about the ineffectiveness of programs. 9 In the area of
policing, Lawrence Sherman and I argued similarly that despite studies
such as the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, the 1970s
produced some examples of successful crime prevention programs in
policing.10 While it was clear that many crime prevention and
rehabilitation efforts did not work, the conclusion that nothing works
was in some ways as naive as the narratives prevalent before the
1970s, which assumed that crime prevention programs were generally
successful."
We are in a period today when there is often a naive counter view
of what works in policing. Many law enforcement leaders are confident
in their ability to control crime. 12 Research supports that confidence,
though rather than suggesting that everything works, it finds that
specific types of programs and practices will impact crime. 13 But the
strength of the evidence for the effectiveness of policing strategies to
control crime has raised a new set of concerns. An argument is
developing both among observers of policing and police scholars that,recent innovations in proactive policing, sometimes called the "new
policing" or "new proactive policing" lead inevitably to abuse and bias
against specific groups. 14 This was an issue raised early by Lawrence

observing from police cars, checking on suspicious citizens or vehicles, and serving warrants).
See WILLIAM SPELMAN & DALE K. BROWN, CALLING THE POLICE: CITIZEN REPORTING OF
SERIOUS CRIME (Nat'l Inst. of Just. 1984).
8

DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 3 (1994).

9 See Ted Palmer, Martinson Revisited, 12 J. OF RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 133 (1975); see also
DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF
TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (Praeger Publishers 1975).
"

See Lawrence W. Sherman & David Weisburd, General Deterrent Effects of Police Patrol in

Crime "Hot Spots": A Randomized, Controlled Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625 (1995).
" See Visher & Weisburd, supra note 4, at 229, for a broader discussion of these issues.
12
See, e.g., Jim Bueermann, Being Smart with Evidence-Based Policing, 269 NAT'L
INST. OF
JUST. J. 12 (2012); Brennan Ctr. for Just., 130 Top Police Chiefs and Prosecutors Urge End to Mass
Incarceration, BRENNAN

CTR.

FOR

JUST.

(Oct.

21,

2015),

http://www.brennancenter.org/

press-release/130-top-police-chiefs-and-prosecutors-urge-end-mass-incarceration
[http://perma.cc/
SZX3-ECWX].
1 See Lawrence W. Sherman & John E. Eck, Policing for Crime Prevention, in EVIDENCEBASED CRIME PREVENTION 295, 412-13 (Lawrence W. Sherman et al. eds., 2002).
14

See, e.g.,

EUGENE MCLAUGHLIN,

Police Culture, in THE

NEW POLICING 143

(Sage
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Sherman, one of the key developers of police innovation over the last
few decades. He wrote in 1986: "Done properly, proactive strategies
need not abuse minority rights or constitutional due process nor hinder
community relations. But the difficulties of implementing such
strategies are substantial[.]"1 5 More recently, this concern has been
raised as one of the key problems with the new proactive policing,
which emerged in the 1990s. Some commentators argue that there is a
choice to be made between the new policing that focused on crime
control, (which inevitably leads to abuse and discriminatory practices),
and a "newer policing" that focuses on the legitimacy of public
perceptions of the police:
We argue that these changing goals and style reflect a
fundamental tension between two models of policing: the
currently dominant proactive risk management model, which
focuses on policing to prevent crimes and makes promises of
short-term security through the professional management of
crime risks, and a model that focuses on building popular
legitimacy by enhancing the relationship between the police and
the public and thereby promoting the long-term goal of policethrough that, public-police
community solidarity and,
cooperation in addressing issues of crime and community
order. 16
Perhaps the most important innovation to emerge in the new
proactive policing to control crime is what has been termed "hot spots"
or "place-based" policing.1 7 Philip Heymann argues in The New
Policing, for example, that the essence of the new policing is its
recognition of the importance of focusing police resources:
What does make a difference, careful evaluations show, is
focusing patrol resources on places and times that have the most
crime. The idea is supported by epidemiological research that
has shown that crime tends to be very localized, and by careful
studies in Minneapolis suggesting that doubling the police
Publications 2007); Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 447, 451
(2000).
15 Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing Communities: What Works?, 8 CRIME. & JUST. 343, 379
(1986).
16 Tom R. Tyler et al., The Consequences of Being an Object of Suspicion: Potential Pitfalls of
ProactivePolice Contact, 12 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 602, 603 (2015).

&

17 See generally Sherman & Weisburd, supra note 10 (finding substantial increases in police
presence in targeted areas reduces crime and disorder in high-crime areas); David Weisburd
Lorraine Green, Policing Drug Hot Spots: The Jersey City Drug Market Analysis Experiment, 12
JUST. Q. 711 (1995) (finding law enforcement is more effective in preventing and reducing crime
focused on specific hot spots, rather than larger areas).
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presence led to a 50 [percent] decrease in crime in the hot spots,
even when the police were not present.1 8
Hot spots policing emerged out of empirical observations that crime
was highly concentrated in urban areas. 19 The logic behind it was
simply that if crime was highly concentrated on specific streets in the
city, the police should focus their interventions at those places. As I
detail below, the evidence base for hot spots policing is very strong. But
in recent years, like other new proactive policing strategies, it has come
under attack because of concerns that it leads to biased and abusive
policing practices. A number of scholars have recently argued that
intensive police interventions, such as hot spots policing, may erode
citizen perceptions of the police. 20 Dennis Rosenbaum, for example,
claims that enforcement-oriented hot spots policing runs the risk of
weakening police-community relations. 21 He notes that aggressive
tactics can drive a wedge between the police and communities, as the
latter can begin to feel like targets rather than partners. 22 This is
particularly relevant in high-crime minority communities, where
perceptions of the police already tend to be more negative. 23
Scholarly criticism has been followed by a growing public narrative
that there are inevitable negative impacts of hot spots policing.
Recently, a newspaper reporter called me and asked, "Is there any
chance I could interview you-even briefly-about law enforcement
arguments that hot spots policing inadvertently creates racial
disparities in who is pulled over, ticketed, etc., because such
neighborhoods are typically populated by minorities?" Whatever the
reality of law enforcement concerns, the question clearly suggests the
argument that hot spots policing and new policing strategies that focus
on crime control more generally lead us to unfair policing strategies.
Similarly, a recent article on police brutality published in The Hill, a
widely distributed political print and Internet paper in Washington,
D.C., notes:

Heymann, supra note 14, at 417 (footnotes omitted).
9

See, e.g., LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, REPEAT CALLS TO THE POLICE IN MINNEAPOLIS (Crime

Control Inst. 1987); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities
and the Criminology of Place, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 37-42 (1989).
20
See, e.g., Dennis P. Rosenbaum, The Limits of Hot Spots Policing, in POLICE INNOVATION:
CONTRASTING PERSPECTIVES 245, 253-54 (David Weisburd & Anthony A. Braga eds., 2006);
Tammy

Rinehart Kochel,

Constructing Hot Spots Policing: Unexamined Consequences for

DisadvantagedPopulationsand for Police Legitimacy, 22 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 350 (2011).
21

See Rosenbaum, supra note 20, at 253-54.

u

See id. at 253-59.
See Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order
Maintenance
Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men's Perceptionsof Police Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255, 262,
13

267, 272 (2010).
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The epidemic of police brutality-primarily affecting black
males-can be linked to the history of a technique called hot
spot [sic] policing, which criminologists Anthony Braga and
David Weisburd have described as a technique that stations
many cops in areas with higher crime rates; these areas
overlapped with areas inhabited by lower-class minorities.
Police initially utilized this technique to prevent crimes from
happening in hot spots, but the specific measures that would be
taken to prevent crime were often left unclear; there were
almost no boundaries to these officers' powers as authority
figures who could stop at nothing in their crime-fighting efforts,
which ironically led to many officers committing brutal crimes
themselves. 24
Clearly, a narrative is developing that links hot spots policing to
unfair and brutal police practices. Below, I examine this growing
narrative both to challenge some of its assumptions and to suggest a
counter narrative about how we can maximize both crime control and
positive evaluations of police legitimacy by integrating what are
sometimes seen as conflicting models of policing. Does hot spots
policing lead to unfair and biased police practices? Is there a
fundamental conflict between the crime control focus of the new
proactive policing, at least as indicated by hot spots policing
approaches, and fair and legitimate police behavior? Or are such
strategies simply like policing more generally-they can be fair or
unfair, biased or unbiased? Can we maximize both the fairness of
policing and police effectiveness within the context of hot spots
policing? These are the main questions this paper seeks to address.
I. HOT SPOTS POLICING: WHERE IT CAME FROM AND WHAT WE KNOW
Hot spots policing, also sometimes referred to as place-based
policing, covers a range of police responses that all focus resources on
the locations where crime is highly concentrated. 25 The specific
geographic area that makes up a hot spot has varied across studies,
ranging from individual addresses or buildings, 26 to single street
27
segments (i.e. both sides of a street from intersection to intersection),
to small groups of street segments with similar crime problems, such as

Gloria Tso,

Police Brutality Is Not Invisible, HILL (Jan. 14, 2016, 6:00
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/ civil-rights/265795-police-brutality-is-not-invisible
[http://perma.cclD5TV-AD9L].
See David Weisburd, Place-BasedPolicing, IDEAS IN AM. POLICING, Jan. 2008, at 4.
2
26
See Sherman et al., supra note 19, at 33.
27
See Sherman & Weisburd, supranote 10, at 633.
24

PM),
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a drug market.28 Hot spots are smaller than the units police
departments have traditionally used to divide up patrol resources, such
as patrol beats, zones, or sectors.
There is no single way to implement hot spots policing. Approaches
can range rather dramatically across interventions. 2 9 For example,
strategies of hot spots policing are often based simply on drastically
increasing officer time spent at hot spots, as was the case in the
Minneapolis, Minnesota, Hot Spots Patrol Experiment.3 0 But hot spots
policing can also employ much more complex interventions to do
something about crime problems. 31 In the Jersey City, New Jersey,
Drug Market Analysis Program Experiment, for example, a three-step
program (including identifying and analyzing problems, developing
tailored responses, and maintaining crime control gains) was used to
reduce problems at drug hot spots. 3 2 Also in Jersey City, in the Jersey
City POP Experiment, a problem-oriented policing approach was taken
in developing a specific strategy for each of the violent crime hot
spots.

33

The idea of hot spots policing developed out of a collaboration
between Lawrence Sherman and me at Rutgers University in the late
1980s, where I had taught and where Sherman spent time as a
distinguished visiting faculty member. When we met, we both found
that we shared common ground in our view of what had to be done in
policing. Both of us felt that prevailing narratives about what the police
could do about crime were wrong. Studies of policing in the previous
decade provided a very strong narrative regarding the inability of the,
police to prevent crime. David Bayley summarized this well when he
wrote on the first page of his influential book Police for the Future, that:
The police do not prevent crime. This is one of the best kept
secrets of modern life. Experts know it, the police know it, but
the public does not know it. Yet the police pretend that they are
society's best defense against crime .

. .

. This is a myth. 34

" See David Weisburd et al., Does Crime Just Move Around the Corner? A Controlled Study of
Spatial Displacement and Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 549, 562 (2006).
29
3o

See Weisburd, supra note 25.
Id. at 4; see Sherman & Weisburd, supra note 10,
at 634.

Weisburd, supra note 25, at 4.
Id.; see Weisburd & Green, supra note 17, at 717-18.
Weisburd, supra note 25, at 4; see Anthony A. Braga et al., Problem-OrientedPolicing
in
Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled Experiment, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 541 (1999).
31

32
3

3

BAYLEY, supra note 8, at 3.
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Both Sherman and I thought that the police could prevent crime,
but they had to reorient their focus to recognize that crime was highly
concentrated in urban areas.
My critique of the academic narrative and standard police practices
developed out of work I had done at the Vera Institute of Justice in
New York. As part of an evaluation of a pilot community-policing
program, I walked the "beat" with nine community police officers four
days a week for a year. They were each assigned beat areas ranging
between twelve and thirty blockS 35 that were considered so-called bad
neighborhoods. The Vera Institute, and indeed the field of criminology
at the time, felt that crime was spread evenly across bad parts of town.
After a few weeks in the field, however, it became apparent to me that
the idea of bad neighborhoods belied the realities of crime in
communities and how the police worked. We did not spend our time
walking around the whole beat that was assigned. Rather, we spent
most of our time at a few "bad places": often a street segment between
two intersections with a good deal of street activity or a few problematic
facilities. This led me to the concept of crime hot spots. Importantly, my
observations of the positive impacts of police focus on those hot spots
led me to doubt the common wisdom that the police could not prevent
crime.
Sherman's interest in hot spots of crime developed out of a study of
crime calls to the police in Minneapolis. With colleagues, he found that
a very large proportion of crime was found at a relatively small number
of places.3 6 Just 3.5% of the addresses in Minneapolis produced 50% of
all crime calls to the police in a single year. Importantly, many studies
since then have confirmed the very significant clustering of crime at
micro-geographic units of analysis. 37 In my Sutherland Address to the

'

See David Weisburd & Jerome E. McElroy, Enacting the CPO Role: Findingsfrom the New

York City Pilot Program in Community Policing, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY

89, 90 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988).
3 See SHERMAN, supra note 19; Sherman et al., supra note 19, at 37-39.
37 See, e.g., WAYMAN J. CROW & JAMES L. BULL, ROBBERY DETERRENCE: AN APPLIED
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE (W. Behavioral Sci. Inst. 1975); GLENN L. PIERCE ET AL., THE
CHARACTER OF POLICE WORK: STRATEGIES AND TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS (1988); Dennis W. Roncek,
Schools and Crime, in ANALYZING CRIME PATTERNS: FRONTIERS OF PRACTICE 153 (Victor

&

Goldsmith et al. eds., 2000); David Weisburd et al., Staking out the Next Generationof Studies of
the Criminology of Place: Collecting Prospective Longitudinal Data at Crime Hot Spots, in THE
FUTURE OF CRIMINOLOGY 236 (Rolf Loeber & Brandon C. Welsh eds., 2012); Martin A. Andresen
Nicolas Malleson, Testing the Stability of Crime Patterns:Implications for Theory and Policy, 000
J. OF RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 1 (2010); Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing
on Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633 (2014); Patricia L.
Brantingham & Paul J. Brantingham, A Theoretical Model of Hot Spot Generation, 8 STUD. ON
CRIME & CRIME PREVENTION 7 (1999); Andrea S. N. Curman et al., Crime and Place: A
Longitudinal Examination of Street Segment Patterns in Vancouver, BC, 31 J. OF QUANTITATIVE

CRIMINOLOGY 127 (2015); David Weisburd & Shai Amram, The Law of Concentrationsof Crime at
Place: The Case of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, 15 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 101 (2014); Weisburd & Green, supra
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American Society of Criminology, I argued that the evidence of crime
concentrations in urban areas made it possible to state a law of crime
concentration at places. 38 Figure 1 (placed at the end of this paper)
shows data on crime incidents in five larger cities. As is apparent,
crime is highly concentrated in large urban areas, with about fifty
percent of crime on streets found at just five percent of streets, and
twenty-five percent of crime found at just one percent of streets.
Based on the idea of hot spots of crime, Sherman and I argued that
the police needed to refocus their crime control efforts. This was key, in
our view, to creating effective policing strategies:
The premise of organizing patrol by beats is that crime could
happen anywhere and that the entire beat must be patrolled.
Computer-age data, however, have given new support to Henry
Fielding's ([1751] 1977) eighteenth century proposal that police
pay special attention to a small number of locations at high risk
of crime. If only 3 percent of the addresses in a city produce
more than half of all the requests for police response, if no police
cars are dispatched to 40 percent of the addresses and
intersections in a city over one year, and, if among the 60
percent with any requests, the majority (31%) register only one
request per year (Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger, 1989), then
concentrating police in a few locations makes more sense than
spreading them evenly through a beat. 39
This led us to the Minneapolis Hot Spots Patrol Experiment
Recognizing that a strong research design would be necessary to
overcome the common narrative that the police could not prevent crime,
we implemented one of the first large-scale randomized experimental
field trials in policing in Minneapolis, Minnesota. One hundred ten
high-crime hot spots were randomly allocated to treatment and control
conditions. The treatment sites received at least twice the level of police
patrol as the control sites (dosage was measured throughout the study).
The results of the Minneapolis Hot Spots Patrol Experiment stood in
sharp contrast to findings in earlier studies. For the eight months in
note 17; David Weisburd et al., Hot Spots of Juvenile Crime: A Longitudinal Study of Arrest
Incidents at Street Segments in Seattle, Washington, 25 J. OF QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 443

(2009); David Weisburd et al., ContrastingCrime General and Crime Specific Theory: The Case of
Hot Spots of Crime, in 4 NEW DIRECTIONS IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 45 (Freda Adler & William

S. Laufer eds., 1993); David Weisburd et al., Trajectories of Crime at Places: A Longitudinal Study
of Street Segments in the City of Seattle, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 283 (2004).
" See David Weisburd, The Law of Crime Concentration and the Criminology of Place, 53
CRIMINOLOGY 133, 138 (2015) ("This law states that for a defined measure of crime at a specific
microgeographic unit, the concentration of crime will fall within a narrow bandwidth of
percentages for a defined cumulative portion of crime.").
3
Sherman & Weisburd, supra note 10, at 629 (citation omitted).
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which the study was properly implemented, we found a significant
relative improvement in the experimental as compared to control hot
spots, both in terms of crime calls to the police and observations of
disorder. 4 0 We concluded that there were "clear, if modest, general
deterrent effects of substantial increases in police presence in crime hot
spots." 4 1 We noted that it was time for "criminologists to stop saying
'there is no evidence' that police patrol can affect crime." 42
In some sense, this was the beginning of the "new policing," or at
least the narrative that has come to predominate: the police, when
properly deployed, can reduce crime. Since the Minneapolis study,
there have been at least nineteen experimental and quasi-experimental
evaluations of hot spots policing programs. 43 The vast majority of these
have shown significant crime prevention benefits. Indeed, twenty of
twenty-five tests of hot spots policing show positive statistically
significant findings, and all randomized trials evidenced significant
positive crime prevention benefits. 44 In 2004, the National Research
Council issued a report on police practices that stated, "studies that
focused police resources on crime hot spots provide the strongest
45
collective evidence of police effectiveness that is now available."
A number of hot spots policing studies have looked at spatial
displacement of crime as a response to police focus on high-crime
places. Spatial crime displacement is the notion that efforts to
eliminate specific crimes at a place will simply cause criminal activity
to move elsewhere, thus negating any crime control gains. In their
systematic review, Anthony Braga and others found statistically
46
significant evidence of spatial displacement in only one study, and
even there, the amount of displacement was far less than the main
crime prevention benefit of the intervention.4 7 Thus, in nearly every
study he reviewed, Braga found that crime did not simply shift from
hot spots to nearby areas. 48 Indeed, a more likely outcome of such
interventions was a diffusion of crime control benefits, in which areas
4o

See id. at 642-43.

41

Id. at 645.

42

Id. at 647.

4

See, e.g., ANTHONY BRAGA ET AL., HOT SPOTS POLICING EFFECTS ON CRIME 6 (David B.

Wilson & Charlotte Gill eds., Campbell Systematic Reviews 8th ed. 2012).
4 See id.
41
WESLEY SKOGAN & KATHLEEN FRYDL, The Effectiveness of Police Activities in Reducing
Crime, Disorder, and Fear, in FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 217, 250

(Nat'l Academies Press, 2004).
4

BRAGA ET AL., supra note 43, at 26.

Id. at 93-94 (citing Jerry H. Ratcliffe et al., The PhiladelphiaFoot Patrol Experiment: A
Randomized Controlled Trial of Police Patrol Effectiveness in Violent Crime Hotspots, 49
CRIMINOLOGY 795 (2011)).
4
See id. at 21-22; see also Weisburd et al., supra note 28, at 554.
4
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surrounding the target hot spots also showed a crime and disorder
reduction. 49 These significant findings for diffusion of crime control
benefits to nearby areas further reinforce the idea that hot spots
policing is effective in reducing crime in the city.
II. DOES HOT SPOTS POLICING INEVITABLY LEAD TO RACIAL OR ETHNIC
BIAS?
Hot spots policing is key to the narrative of an effective new
proactive policing that has developed over the last decade. But as I
noted at the outset, there is a growing argument that there is a "dark"
side to hot spots policing strategies. They are seen as inevitably leading
to biased policing. For many commenters and the media, as I noted in
the introduction, the focus on crime hot spots is assumed to lead to
policing that is heavily focused on minority and poor communities. Of
course, policing in the United States has historically been heavily
focused on disadvantaged and minority communities.5 0 Whether that is
due to differential involvement of minorities and the poor in crime, or
differential selection of minorities and the poor for police attention is a
matter of debate.5 1 Whatever the cause, the key question is whether hot
spots policing leads to greater focus and more bias than traditional
policing approaches.
A key reason for the heightened presence of police in many
minority and disadvantaged communities is that they are often places
with higher levels of reported crime. 52 Most American police agencies
conform to a rapid response philosophy that leads them to put more
cars in geographic areas where there is more crime. 53 If you want to
have police available to respond rapidly to emergency crime calls from
citizens, you need to have cars patrolling in those areas routinely.
Inevitably this leads to more police in poor and disadvantaged
49

See, e.g., Ronald V. Clarke & David Weisburd, Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits:

Observations on the Reverse of Displacement, in 2 CRIME PREVENTION STUDIES 165 (Ronald V.
Clarke ed., Crim. Just. Press 1994).
'0

See Gary Cordner,

Community Policing, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLICE AND

POLICING 148 (Michael D. Reisig & Robert J. Kane eds., 2014); Kristina Murphy & Adrian
Cherney, Policing Ethnic Minority Groups with Procedural Justice: An Empirical Study (Alfred
Deakin Research Inst., Working Paper No. 02, 2010).
5
See Alex R. Piquero, DisproportionateMinority Contact, 18 JUV. JUST. 59 (2008).
5

See Charis

E.

Kubrin,

Crime and the Racial Composition of Communities,

in

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 673-81 (David Weisburd & Gerban Jan

Nicolaas Bruinsma eds., 2013); Steven Raphael & Melissa Sills, Urban Crime in the United States,
in A COMPANION TO URBAN ECONOMICS (Richard Arnott & Dan McMillen eds., 2005); Steven
Raphael & Michael Stoll, Why Are So Many Americans in Prison?,in DO PRISONS MAKE US SAFER?
THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BooM (Steven Raphael & Michael Stoll eds., 2009).
'

See generally RICHARD C. LARSON, MIT PRESS, URBAN POLICE PATROL ANALYSIS (1972);

Stephen Sacks, Evaluation of Police PatrolPatterns (Economics Working Papers, Working paper
No. 200317, 2003).
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communities. In conversations with progressive police executives, I
have been struck by their recognition as well that policing is a service
and that communities with more serious crime problems need that
service more than other communities. They also recognize that
disadvantaged communities may have fewer resources-for example,
less access to private policing-than do more affluent communities. In
this sense, for progressive police executives the fact that there is more
policing in minority and disadvantaged communities reflects their
efforts to more fairly and equitably distribute police resources.
This perspective of course ignores the fact that increased levels of
policing can lead to unintended negative consequences. Police service
can lead to the reduction of liberties of citizens through such law
enforcement actions as police stops or arrests. While the purpose of
these activities may be to aid the community in its efforts to reduce
crime, for individuals who live in communities where there are more
police, this can mean an increased likelihood of being the focus of such
actions. Of course, the extent of the intrusions on citizens will depend
on the type of policing employed in a particular agency. However, it is
common for the police to fall back upon their law enforcement powers
in dealing with crime problems. 54 Accordingly, irrespective of the
motivation for allocating more police resources to disadvantaged and
minority neighborhoods, this can lead to a greater probability of people
in such communities having law enforcement contacts with the police.
Ideally, hot spots policing does not reinforce the communityfocused idea of police services. Indeed, it pushes the police to think of
bad places rather than bad communities. In this context, police
resources are not focused on large geographic areas but on the specific
places in communities where crime is concentrated. Figure 2 shows
chronic crime hot spots in the city of Seattle, Washington. The figure
depicts the one percent of streets that produced approximately twentyfive percent of crime each year in the city over a sixteen-year period.
Disadvantaged minority areas are generally identified as being in the
lower right hand side of the map. These are the so-called bad
neighborhoods. Nonetheless, while these areas have hot spots of crime,
hot spots are clearly distributed throughout the city. An important
locus for hot spots is in the central business district. And hot spots can
also be found in the wealthier Northern areas of the city, though in
smaller numbers. Examination of other larger cities studied in this way

' ANTHONY A. BRAGA & DAVID WEISBURD, Problem-Oriented Policing: The Disconnect
Between Principles and Practice, in POLICE INNOVATION: CONTRASTING PERSPECTIVES 133-52

(David Weisburd & Anthony A. Braga eds., 2006).
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generally leads to a similar portrait of the spread of hot spots across a
city.55
Figure 3, which shows the crime trajectories over time of individual
streets in the Southern part of Seattle, Washington, reinforces this idea
further. In this figure, we see the street-by-street variability in crime
within the more disadvantaged neighborhoods of Seattle. What is
apparent is that most of the streets in a so-called bad neighborhood
have little or no crime (represented by the thinner lighter tinted
streets). There are chronic crime hot spots (represented by the wider
dark tinted streets), but they represent a small proportion of the streets
in the neighborhood. Accordingly, a hot spots focus should also
concentrate and focus police activities on specific streets within
communities. This should lead to less arbitrary allocations of police
services, and ultimately should restrict the downside of police presence.
Such careful targeting of the allocation of policing can in this sense
reduce the dark side of police services, since law enforcement would be
focused on specific blocks and not on whole neighborhoods.
III. DOES THE FOCUS ON HOT SPOTS INEVITABLY LEAD TO ABUSIVE
POLICE PRACTICES AND DECLINING POLICE LEGITIMACY?

Even if hot spots policing focuses police activities more carefully,
and therefore frees much of the community from the unintended
negative consequences of policing, people who live on streets that are
the focus of hot spots policing may be more likely to be stopped,
questioned, or arrested. While there is a strong body of evidence that
hot spots policing can reduce crime and disorder at crime hot spots,
recent critiques of hot spots policing tactics have focused on potential
increases in citizen fear of crime, or declines in collective efficacy and
police legitimacy. These critiques argue that focusing intense police
presence on small crime hot spots may have unintended negative
consequences for the community or the police themselves.5 6
Rosenbaum argues, for example, that hot spots policing will lead to
adverse impacts on police-community relations, and thus the legitimacy
of the police in the community.57 Legitimacy refers to the "judgments

' See, e.g., Weisburd & Amram, supra note 37, at 107; David Weisburd et al., Could
Innovations in Policing Have Contributed to the New York City Crime Drop Even in a Period of
Declining Police Strength?: The Case of Stop, Question and Frisk as a Hot Spots Policing Strategy,
31 JUST. Q. 129 (2014).
' See, e.g., Joshua C. Hinkle & David Weisburd, The Irony of Broken Windows Policing: A
Micro-Place Study of the Relationship Between Disorder, Focused Police Crackdowns and Fear of
Crime, 36 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 503, 508-10 (2008); Kochel, supra note 20, at 362-67; Rosenbaum,
supra note 20.
5
Rosenbaum, supra note 20, at 253-54.
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that ordinary citizens make about the rightfulness of police conduct."5 8
Research suggests that when citizens perceive police actions as
legitimate, they are not only more likely to view the police more
positively, but are also more likely to comply with the law in the
future.5 9 While residents may initially be pleased to have the police
addressing problems on their street, Rosenbaum suggests that over
time there is a risk that residents may begin to feel like targets of the
police rather than partners in crime prevention. 60 Tammy Rinehart
Kochel argues in turn, that the "police must recognize that in hot spots,
they are working with populations who are more skeptical and less
trusting of the police. Therefore, aggressive or intrusive policing tactics,
while effective as short-term crime fighting strategies, may have longterm implications for police legitimacy."6 1
Despite arguments that intensive interventions, such as hot spots
policing, will have negative impacts on citizen perceptions, there is very
little evidence to support this position. A study by Joshua Hinkle and I
did find that police crackdowns on crime and disorder hot spots led
people living in the targeted areas to become more fearful of crime. 62
However, that study was based on a correlational design, in which the
affected hot spot areas had levels of overall crime higher than the
comparison areas used in the study. Moreover, a number of studies to
date provide evidence of neutral or even positive impacts on citizen
perceptions.
There is evidence from a number studies that residents in crime
hot spots who are subject to focused police attention welcome the
concentration of police efforts in problem places. 63 For example, a study
linked to the Kansas City Gun Experiment 64 found that the community
at and near hot spots strongly supported the intensive patrols and
perceived an improvement in the quality of life in the treatment
neighborhood. 65

" WESLEY SKOGAN & KATHLEEN FRYDL, Police Fairness: Legitimacy as the Consent of the
Public, in FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 291, 291 (Nat'1 Academies

Press, 2004).
9 See id. at 291-92.
" Rosenbaum, supra note 20, at 253.
61 Kochel, supra note 20, at 366.
62
See Hinkle & Weisburd, supranote 56, at 508.
6
See, e.g., Steven Chermak et al., Citizens' Perceptions of Aggressive Traffic Enforcement
Strategies, 18 JUST. Q. 365 (2001); Nicholas Corsaro et al., Evaluatinga Policing Strategy Intended
to Disrupt an Illicit Street-Level Drug Market, EVALUATION REV., 2010, at 25-26.
64 See generally Lawrence W. Sherman & Dennis P. Rogan, Effects of Gun Seizures on Gun
Violence: "Hot Spots" Patrolin Kansas City, 12 JUST. Q. 673 (1995).
* See James W. Shaw, Community PolicingAgainst Guns: Public Opinion of the Kansas City
Gun Experiment, 12 JUST. Q. 695, 706-09 (1995).
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One recent study by Anthony Braga and Brenda Bond examined
community reaction to the problem-oriented policing initiative in
Lowell, Massachusetts. 6 6 Data from interviews showed that the
community perceived improvements in social and physical disorder and
had an increased number of contacts with the police. However, no
statistically significant differences were found in fear of crime or
perceptions of police tactics or demeanor. 6 7 Recent experimental
research from three cities in San Bernardino County, California, also
found that a broken windows style intervention (in which the police
focused on reducing incivilities) at hot spots had no impact on resident
perceptions of fear of crime or police legitimacy. 68 A randomized
experiment in Illinois found that though there were initial declines in
legitimacy from intensive police patrols and problem solving at hot
spots, those effects withered quickly. 69 Importantly, the study found no
evidence of increases in perceived abuse by police in the hot spots that
received the experimental interventions. 70
Of course, hot spots policing practices in the field may include
abusive policing practices in specific cases. For example, my colleagues
and I found that stop, question, and frisk (SQF) tactics were carried out
in New York City as a hot spots policing approach.71 While it was often
assumed that SQFs were applied widely and randomly across
neighborhoods in New York City, we found a strong correlation
between crime hot spots and SQFs. A very large proportion of SQFs
were found at a small number of places in the city. More than fifty
percent of SQFs at street segments were found at one percent of the
segments, and fifty percent of SQFs at intersections were found at five
percent of the intersections. 72 In turn, we found that SQFs in New York
City were associated with significant crime deterrence at a microgeographic level. 7 3

6

See Anthony A. Braga & Brenda J. Bond, Community Perceptions of Police Crime

Prevention Efforts: Using Interviews in Small Areas to Evaluate Crime Reduction Strategies, in 24
EVALUATING CRIME REDUCTION INITIATIVES 87 (Johannes Knutsson & Nick Tilley eds., Criminal

Justice Press 2009); Anthony A. Braga & Brenda J. Bond, Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots:
A Randomized Controlled Trial, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 577 (2008).
67 Braga & Bond, Community Perceptions, supra note 66, at 110.

8 David Weisburd et al., The Possible "Backfire"Effects of Broken Windows Policing at Crime
Hot Spots: An Experimental Assessment of Impacts on Legitimacy, Fear and Collective Efficacy, 7
J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 297, 299, 310 (2011).
" See TAMMY RINEHART KOCHEL ET AL., ST LOUIS COUNTY HOT SPOTS IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS
(SCHIRA) FINAL REPORT: ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF HOT SPOTS POLICING STRATEGIES ON POLICE
LEGITIMACY, CRIME, AND COLLECTIVE EFFICACY 9-10 (2015).
70

See id. at 10-11.

"

See Weisburd et al., supra note 55, at 139-46.
See id. at 141.
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But there is little question that the application of SQFs in New
York City led to unintended negative consequences and abusive
policing. In 2011, almost 700,000 people were stopped in New York City
according to data provided by the police, and most were young, poor,
and minorities. 7 4 The growing dissatisfaction with the police in
minority communities and especially among minority youth was a key
factor in fueling the legal challenges to the NYPD's SQF policies.75 As a
result, in Floyd v. City of New York, 76 the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York ruled that SQFs as carried out in New
York were unconstitutional, and appointed a special monitor to
institute substantive reforms.7 7

While hot spots policing does not necessarily lead to abusive police
strategies, clearly unfair and abusive strategies can be used in hot
spots policing programs. Hot spots policing is about the efficient focus
of police resources at places where crime is concentrated. When police
use policing models like increased police patrol or problem-oriented
policing at crime hot spots, there is little evidence that people who live
at those places are affected negatively either in terms of fear of crime,
perceptions of the police, or police legitimacy. In turn, the one
experimental study that examined the potential for abusive policing at
hot spots found that citizens who lived in hot spots that were targeted
with intensive police patrols or problem-oriented policing were not
more likely to see the police as more abusive than those in the control
condition.7 8

Police can of course use abusive tactics at crime hot spots, such as
SQFs carried out on a major scale. And we would expect that if they
did, it would lead to negative evaluations of the police and decreased
police legitimacy, though we have no data as yet on these questions.
But such tactics can also be applied more broadly and unrelated to hot
spots policing. The larger question is whether hot spots policing can be
carried out in ways that not only reduce potential negative outcomes,
but also actually improve legitimacy evaluations of the police.

7 See id. at 48.
7 See Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department's "Stopand-Frisk"Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. OF THE AM. STAT. AsS'N 813, 813
(2007).
76
959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
" See Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York's Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 12, 2013), http: /www.nytimes.com/20 13/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-violatedrights-judge-rules.html?_r=O [http://perma.cc/V7XC-VHPS]; Floyd v. City of New York, CTR. FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, http://ccrjustice.org/ home/what-we-do/our-cases/floyd-et-al-v-city-newyork-et-al [http://perma.cc/WG63-ULKU].
"

See KOCHEL ET AL., supra note 69.
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IV. CAN WE MAXIMIZE EFFECTIVENESS, FAIRNESS, AND LEGITIMACY ALL
AT THE SAME TIME IN THE NEW PROACTIVE POLICING?7 9

In contrast to the strong scientific evidence on the crime prevention
effectiveness of hot spots policing, there is far less rigorous evidence on
the prospects of procedural fairness, consensus building, and
transparency in improving community perceptions of the legitimacy of
police actions. Practical experience and the available research evidence
are strong enough, however, to observe that inappropriate police
actions, such as excessive force, disrespectful treatment, and
indiscriminate enforcement, have undesirable impacts on policecommunity relations. In short, there are more and less desirable ways
to address crime and disorder problems in hot spot areas. Normative
assessments of planned actions can be helpful in avoiding community
backlash when concentrating police resources in small places.
My colleague Anthony Braga and I argue in our book, Policing
Problem Places, that hot spots policing represents an approach to crime
prevention that not only has the potential to generate strong crime
prevention gains, but also, if implemented properly, increase police
legitimacy in the eyes of community members.80 The police need active
public cooperation, not simply political support and approval, to control
crime and maintain order. Cooperation increases not only when the
police are viewed as effective in preventing crime and maintaining
order, but also when citizens see the police as legitimate authorities
who are entitled to be obeyed.8 1 Legitimacy judgments are shaped by
public views about the fairness of the processes the police use when
dealing with members of the public. 82
Hot spots policing programs should be developed and implemented
by police managers with the ideas of legitimacy and fairness in mind.
Minority residents tend to view the police with distrust and suspicion. 83
At certain times and in certain places in U.S. history, the police have
subjected African American communities to high levels of arrest,
abusive and corrupt behavior, and physical brutality. More recently,

This section relies heavily on work Anthony Braga and I published. See ANTHONY BRAGA

&
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(2010).
8

BRAGA & WEISBURD, supra note 54.

" See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the
Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 231, 262 (2008).
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R. Tyler et al.,

&

Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice, and Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders'
Psychological Mechanisms in the Canberra RISE Drinking-and-DrivingExperiment, 41 LAW
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"

See RONALD WEITZER & STEVEN A. TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA: CONFLICT AND

REFORM 5-6 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).

678

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[ 2016

ongoing poor relations between minorities and the police have been
highlighted in the debate over racial profiling.8 4 As Lawrence Sherman
observes, "counteracting this legacy may require more public
accountability for the processes by which police select crime-prevention
strategies and risk-factor targets."8 5 A police focus on crime hot spots
can be correlated with race, but the correlation is a coincidence rather
than a cause. Public concern over racial profiling is often the result of
poorly delineated offender profiles rather than more precisely drawn
offense profiles, such as risk analyses that identify particular highactivity crime places in need of attention. 86
The concentration of crime in space and time provides an
important opportunity for consensus building and transparency in
target selection that can go far in bringing the police closer to the
communities they seek to serve. Within a community-policing
framework, hot spots policing initiatives can be framed as collaborative
exercises where the police and community jointly review crime maps
and select particular places for focused attention. In these settings,
police and community members can also discuss the range of strategies
that might be adopted to address targeted crime hot spots.
Consensus and transparency, coupled with a tight focus on highcrime locations, can enhance the legitimacy of police intrusions that are
necessary to intercept criminals for violating "risk laws," such as those
against carrying guns or driving while intoxicated. Increasing police
presence and police-citizen contacts in high-activity places can be
important strategies to reduce gun violence8 7 and drunk driving
fatalities.8 8 To maintain the legitimacy of these important enforcement
activities in crime hot spot areas, police need to pay attention to what
Tom Tyler and others call "procedural justice," in their interactions
with citizens.8 9 Traffic and pedestrian stops need to be viewed as
procedurally fair by citizens subjected to the police intrusion.
84 See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race
and Disorderin New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 (2000) (finding police in New York City
stop and frisk individuals largely based on race); David A. Harris, Stories, the Statistics, and the
Law: Why "DrivingWhile Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999) (finding police use traffic

stops as a pretense to search black drivers).
8

Lawrence W. Sherman, Fair and Effective Policing, in CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME

CONTROL 383, 395 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., Inst. for Contemporary Studies 2002).
See id. at 397-98.
8
See Sherman & Rogan, supra note 64 (finding intensive police patrol of gun hot spots
87
reduced gun-related violence).

&

m Cf. Lawrence W. Sherman, Attacking Crime: Police and Crime Control, 15 CRIME & JUST.
159, 199-203 (1992) (problem-solving and directed patrol are two popular strategies police use to
alleviate soft crime, which includes drunk-driving).
See generally TYLER, supra note 82, at 6-7, 115-61; Tyler et al., supra note 82; Tyler
88
Fagan, supra note 81, at 264-65 (finding procedural justice is a key factor in shaping police
legitimacy).
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Fair policing requires police officers to treat citizens with respect
and dignity throughout the interaction between a police officer and a
citizen, to explain that their intrusion on the citizen's activities was
based on neutral and objective criteria, and to allow citizens the
opportunity to explain their behavior.9 0 The particular strategies
selected to address crime hot spots can obviously either enhance or
undermine police legitimacy. Overly aggressive and indiscriminate
arrest-based strategies are more likely to generate community concern
and poor relations. Unfortunately, zero-tolerance approaches that
advocate full enforcement of all laws, no matter how minor, to reduce
serious crimes have been engaged in by police departments from
Australia to Arizona.9 1 Zero-tolerance approaches are a perversion of
the tight focus of broken windows policing on controlling disorderly
behavior to prevent more serious crimes. 92 Zero-tolerance strategies
seem to generate more harm in disadvantaged communities already
suffering from serious crime and disorder problems, as evidenced by
studies suggesting elevated complaints against the police, and
increased arrests and subsequent incarceration of young minority
men. 93
Police agencies need to move away from one-dimensional intensive
enforcement efforts to control crime hot spots. Aggressive law
enforcement strategies certainly have their place, but they can lead to
negative outcomes as well. Although deterrence is an important
component of crime prevention efforts of the police, 94 negative
interactions with the police run the risk of alienating not just offenders,
but the wider community. Research suggests that the large-scale cycle
of arrest, removal, and return of individuals damages the stability of
familial and community relationships, disrupts neighborhood life, and
erodes the capacity of neighborhoods for self-regulation. 95 Police
strategies at hot spots must balance the need for deterrence, with the
"

See SKOGAN & FRYDL, supra note 45.

91

See Sherman, supra note 85, at 394.

92

Cf. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood

Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/198203/broken-windows

[http://perma.cclH6LD-D25R] (arguing modern-day policing has shifted from the broken-windows
approach that focused on community disorder to a focus on individual conduct).
93
See, e.g., Judith A. Greene, Zero Tolerance: A Case Study of Police Policies and Practices
in
New York City, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 176-77 (1999); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig,
Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing and Misdemeanor MarijuanaArrests in New York City,
1989-2000, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POLY 165 (2007).
9
See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin et al., Deterrence, Criminal Opportunities, and Police, 53
CRIMINOLOGY 74, 84-85, 93 (2015); Cynthia Lum & Daniel Nagin, Reinventing American Policing:
A Seven-Point Blueprint for the 21st Century, 2015 TRANSLATIONAL CRIMINOLOGY 2, 3-4.
** See, e.g., TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: How MASS INCARCERATION MAKES
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 58-59, 73-85 (2007); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT
AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (Russell Sage Found. 2006).
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importance of gaining trust on the streets where police work. Moreover,
they have to place approaches that increase trust and cooperation of
the community at the forefront of their efforts. This means that police
in the field should integrate hot spots policing strategies with
strategies that are meant to increase public trust in the police. While
we have yet to develop clear evidence on this question, it is my
proposition that we can maximize crime control and police legitimacy in
the context of hot spots policing.
V. IS A NEw GENERATION OF HOT SPOTS POLICING PROGRAMS
POSSIBLE?
Arguing that hot spots programs should be developed to maximize
crime control and police legitimacy simultaneously leads to the
question of what such programs would look like in practice. My
colleagues and I are developing two such programs at this juncture,
which should yield important guidance for hot spots policing programs
in the future.
Brooklyn Park: Assets Coming Together to Take Action

A.

Charlotte Gill and I are working with the city of Brooklyn Park,
Minnesota, to test whether hot spots policing can increase collective
efficacy and enhance informal social controls at the same time that it
improves evaluations of police legitimacy.96 "Collective efficacy" refers
to the ability of communities to use informal social controls to solve
community problems.9 7 The program in Brooklyn Park focuses police
patrol on crime hot spots, but also focuses the police on increasing
community trust and cooperation for collective action at the targeted
places. We are conducting a randomized experimental evaluation of the
program including forty-two crime hot spots. The evaluation will
include both assessments of changes in crime and collective efficacy,
and in citizen perceptions of the police and police legitimacy.
Brooklyn Park is well situated as the study site for this effort. With
98
a population of about 78,000 people over twenty-six square miles, it is
16
See David Weisburd et al., Increasing Collective Efficacy and Social Capital at Crime Hot
Spots: New Crime Control Tools for Police, POLICING, July 12, 2015 (describing the ongoing
Brooklyn Park research project).

97

See, e.g., ROBERT J. SAMPSON,

GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING

NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 127 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2012); Christopher R. Browning et al., The
Paradox of Social Organization: Networks, Collective Efficacy, and Violent Crime in Urban
Neighborhoods, 83 Soc. FORCES 503, 504 (2004); Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and
Violent Crime:A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918, 919 (1997).
8 U.S. Census Bureau, Brooklyn Park (city), Minnesota, STATE & COUNTY QUICK FACTS,
[http://perma.cc /E32Z-XUWR]
http: //quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/27/2707966.html
(last updated Dec. 2, 2015, 9:30 AM).
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the second-largest suburb in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan
area, and the sixth-largest city in the state of Minnesota.99
Traditionally a bedroom community for nearby Minneapolis, Brooklyn
Park is 85-percent developed and has a high population densityalmost 3000 residents per square mile. 100 There is no true downtown
area, but both residential and commercial properties exist in the city.
The population of Brooklyn Park is highly diverse. About twenty
percent of residents are foreign-born and almost fifty percent are nonWhite.10 1 Importantly, Brooklyn Park's crime rate is the highest
amongst Minneapolis-St. Paul suburbs, with 50,000 residents or more.
Much of this crime is concentrated at hot spots characterized by lowincome public housing and low-rent apartments, as well as residential
areas that have been affected by economic hardship and foreclosures.
The mixed land use, high population density and heterogeneity, and
population turnover associated with these locations suggest a
connection between low collective efficacy and crime.
At full strength, the Brooklyn Park Police Department (BPPD) has
108 sworn officers, with 48 officers, 9 sergeants, and 2 lieutenants
assigned to patrol. The department has a long history of collaborating
with community service providers, community coalitions, and schools.
Former Chief Michael Davis was instrumental in developing a culture
of community collaboration, and this has continued with the current
leadership; however, BPPD sought a more systematic approach to
community outreach and problem solving.
The program is organized around three essential preconditions of
collective efficacy: (i) the establishment of proximal relationships with
and between residents, (ii) the development of working trust between
relevant parties, and (iii) the shared expectations that result from that
trust and compel residents to act against social problems. 102 The entire
BPPD patrol force, including fifty patrol officers, participated in a oneday training in understanding the causal relationship between
collective efficacy and crime, and how to apply this knowledge to
community-building and problem-solving strategies. The content of the
training day was specifically designed to operationalize collective
efficacy at the street level.
The training was designed and delivered by the entire project team
including senior officers and project coordinators from BPPD, the
9

Brooklyn Park FAQ, BROOKLYN PARK, http://www.brooklynpark.org/ faq/ [https:lperma.cc/

Y677-YPCH].
'0
U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 98.
101
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efficacy.").
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research team, and subject matter experts in collective efficacy and
policing. Importantly, for buy-in, a small team of officers was selected
to pilot test the first stage of the intervention in a selected location and
report back at the training, so officers could connect the theory with
practical application by their peers.
The intervention itself consists of a three-stage process termed,
"Brooklyn Park: Assets Coming Together to Take Action" (BP-ACT).
1. Assets (asset identification).
Officers identify both the specific problems at hot spots and the key
stakeholders and resources ("assets") that should be involved in solving
them. The problem solving process places primary emphasis on
identification of key assets, such as residents, business owners, and
community groups within the micro-community of the hot spot. Assets
may also be anchor points (social service agencies, schools, places of
worship, etc.) that may be outside the precise boundaries of the hot spot
but are meaningful to residents. 103 Officers identify these assets
through conversations with local actors during their discretionary time,
and by utilizing the local knowledge they obtain through regular police
work. A procedural justice dialogue script guides these conversations,
at least initially, to help build trust and social capital with and among
residents.1 0 4 Importantly, this stage also involves assessing the
liabilities at a location. We have seen that some individuals or
organizations in a hot spot may be closely tied to the crime problems at
that place and may not be best placed to help solve them. In this case,
police also focus on stabilizing the location (in some cases, through
more traditional law enforcement methods, albeit with a view to
protecting community trust that has already been developed).
2. Coming together (coalescence).
This phase builds upon traditional community-oriented and
problem-oriented approaches by emphasizing the creation of policecommunity problem-solving partnerships that build residents'
willingness to take ownership of local crime issues. During this phase,
officers gather intelligence from the community, work with
stakeholders to implement crime prevention strategies, and-key to our
approach-use their training in collective efficacy and community

'0
See CRAIG D. UCHIDA ET AL., DATA-DRIVEN CRIME PREVENTION: NEW TOOLS FOR
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT AND CRIME CONTROL 2, 7 (Justice & Sec. Strategies 2013).

10' See Lorraine Mazerolle et al., Procedural Justice, Routine Encounters and Citizen
Perceptionsof Police: Main Findingsfrom the Queensland Community Engagement Trial (QCET),
8 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 343, 351-53 (2012).
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building to focus residents on creating collective ownership over the hot
spot. Officers match identified assets to identified problems within each
hot spot through small group conversations or more formal meetings.
3. Taking action (follow-up).
In the taking action phase, patrol officers submit information on
their activities to BPPD's project coordinator. Officers and the project
coordinator then collaborate to assess and track the implementation
and progress of agreed-upon community actions in a shared project
database. We are now in the sixth month of project implementation,
and there is strong evidence that the patrol force can move beyond its
law enforcement role to an approach that seeks to emphasize
community building at hot spots. While ordinary patrols and
enforcement actions made up some 63.4% of the activities at the
treatment locations in the first two months of the project, by the fifth
and sixth months, identifying assets and interactions with community
members made up 63.0% of activities. In turn, in most of the hot spots
in the study, police have organized community meetings with the goal
of developing action plans on the streets.
We will see over time whether these efforts and this reorientation
of how hot spots are dealt with in a city will have positive outcomes.
Prior research suggests that the focus on crime hot spots will yield
crime prevention gains. We hope that the community engagement focus
of the study will in turn allow such gains, while also increasing
collective efficacy and evaluations of police legitimacy.
B.

Procedural Justice Policing at Crime Hot Spots

Cody Telep, Anthony Braga, Tracey Meares, and I are developing a
second innovative approach with the Police Foundation in Washington,
D.C., that seeks to maximize crime control and evaluations of police
legitimacy simultaneously. The Arnold Foundation has funded our
project, and we have received commitments from four cities for a multicity randomized trial. We seek to answer two key questions: (1) Can the
development of a hot spots policing program with a strong procedural
justice component enhance citizen perceptions of police legitimacy? (2)
Can the program improve the effectiveness of hot spots policing,
leading to greater long-term crime prevention gains?
Tom Tyler and Yuen Huo note that legitimacy can arise from
giving citizens either favorable outcomes, or simply a sense that the
outcomes are equitable (distributive justice). 105 But they argue that the
'0
TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HuO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 50-51 (Russell Sage Found. 2002).
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greatest legitimacy and legal compliance are produced when police
attend to procedural justice, 106 which is "an evaluation of the fairness of
10
the manner in which [a person's] problem or dispute was handled."
Police officers often face situations where it is difficult to produce a
positive outcome for all parties. A traffic violator, for example, will not
view a speeding ticket as a favorable outcome. Nevertheless, according
to the procedural justice framework, if the officer treats the citizen
fairly, the citizen is likely to accept the outcome, and this display of
fairness will enhance or at least not decrease the legitimacy of the
police. 108 The President's Task Force has also identified procedural
justice as a key concern for agency efforts to enhance citizen
perceptions of police legitimacy. The Task Force concluded that "law
enforcement culture should embrace a guardian mindset to build public
trust and legitimacy. Toward that end, police and sheriffs' departments
should adopt procedural justice as the guiding principle for internal
and external policies and practices to guide their interactions with the
citizens they serve." 109 Our question is whether hot spots policing
enhanced with procedural justice training will allow police to maximize
crime prevention and police legitimacy simultaneously.
A few field studies have examined the impact of procedural justice
approaches and increased legitimacy on the behavior of citizens.
Stephen Mastrofski and colleagues found that factors related to
legitimacy were key predictors of citizen compliance with police
directives.1 10 In a re-analysis of data from the Milwaukee Domestic
Violence Experiment, Raymond Paternoster and colleagues found that
when officers arrested domestic violence suspects using principles of
procedural justice, the suspects were significantly less likely to reengage in domestic violence.11 1 This effect was consistent across
suspects with different demographic characteristics. They concluded
that perceived procedural justice nullified the criminogenic influence of
being arrested for spousal offenses. 112 John McCluskey found in his

106

Id.

SKOGAN & FRYDL, supra note 58, at 301. While we focus here on Tyler's process-based
157
model of procedural justice, legitimacy, and compliance, we recognize that some scholars have
argued that factors other than procedural justice also have strong impacts on citizen perceptions of
legitimacy. See, e.g., Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe, Beyond ProceduralJustice:A Dialogic
Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 119 (2012).
See Tyler & Fagan, supranote 81.
117
'" OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK
FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 9 (2015).
"0 See Stephen D. Mastrofski et al., Compliance on Demand: The Public's Response to Specific
Police Requests, 33 J. OF RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 269, 298 (1996).
"' See Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural
Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 163, 192 (1997).
112
See id.; see also Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of
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analysis of police requests for citizen self-control (ending disorderly
behavior, leaving the scene) that multiple procedural justice
characteristics were significant. 113 Respectful treatment from the police
doubled the odds of compliance, while disrespectful behavior made
noncompliance almost twice as likely. 1 14 When the police cut off a
citizen from telling his or her side of the story, resistance was two times
more likely, and compliance was significantly more likely when the
police showed they were interested in gathering information to make
an informed decision.1 15
In our study, we want to see whether hot spots policing enhanced
with procedural justice training can have a direct impact on offending
at the hot spots, and a longer term impact on compliance with the law
more generally among people that have contact with the police. If both
of these outcomes are found, combined with increased perceptions of
police legitimacy, it would mean that we cannot only simultaneously
prevent crime and increase police legitimacy, but that this approach
also increases crime prevention benefits over standard hot spots
policing approaches.
We will identify forty to fifty crime hot spots in each of the four
agencies (160-200 total), which would be divided equally between a
"standard hot spots policing" condition and an "enhancing procedural
justice in hot spots" condition. Officers will be assigned to focus extra
time and enforcement activity on street blocks in the "standard hot
spots" condition using traditional law enforcement approaches. Half the
hot spots will be in the "enhancing procedural justice in hot spots"
condition and receive intensive police attention in addition to efforts to
increase the use of procedural justice in police-citizen interactions.
Officers would similarly focus extra time and enforcement activity on
assigned street blocks, but would receive forty hours of training related
to procedural justice and enhancing citizen perceptions of police
legitimacy. The training will be developed as part of the project and
emphasize the quality of interactions with the public. Topics will
include giving citizens a sense of participation and ways to demonstrate
neutrality and respect. Officers in this group will also use a checklist in
the field to reinforce the training.
Data to assess the impact of the intervention on crime will come
from official data (calls for service, arrests, and incident reports before,

the CriminalSanction, 30 J. OF RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 445 (1993).
"' See
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during, and after the intervention). We will also examine resident
perceptions of legitimacy with door-to-door interviews before and after
the intervention, and conduct a survey of people who had police contact
in hot spots under both conditions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Narratives are important in crime prevention. In the 1970s, a
dominant narrative emerged that assumed that the police could not
prevent crime. Over the last two decades, that narrative has been
overturned by one that recognizes that proactive policing can be
effective in reducing crime. The development of hot spots policing
approaches has been key to the development of this new proactive
policing. Today, there is little doubt that such strategies can be
effective in reducing crime without displacement. But as I noted at the
outset, a new narrative is developing that argues that hot spots
policing, as well as other proactive deterrence based policing strategies,
are likely to lead to biased and abusive police practices. I have argued
that hot spots policing properly implemented is likely to lead to less
biased policing than traditional strategies. Moreover, there is little
evidence that hot spots policing per se leads to abusive policing
practices. Rather, abusive policing approaches can be applied in hot
spots policing just as they can be applied more generally in standard
policing practices. Finally, I argued for a new generation of programs
and practices in hot spots policing that attempts to maximize crime
control and legitimacy simultaneously, and I described two ongoing
examples of programs that are taking this approach.
Having worked to overcome the "nothing works" narrative in
policing, it would be a pity if new policing strategies-such as hot spots
policing-were abandoned based on assumptions of negative
unintended outcomes. The task is to take the knowledge we have
gained over the last few decades and to enhance hot spots policing by
recognizing the importance of citizen evaluations of the police. I suspect
that if we do this we will not only increase legitimacy evaluations of the
police, but we will also increase crime prevention gains. But unlike the
evidence on the crime control outcomes of hot spots policing, we still
know little about whether enhancing hot spots policing, or other
policing strategies for that matter, in conjunction with procedural
justice approaches will improve policing. It is time to develop an
evidence base for these questions.
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VII. FIGURES

Fieure 1: Crime Concentration in Five Cities*
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*Reprinted from: David Weisburd, The Law of Crime Concentration
and the Criminology of Place, 53 CRIMINOLOGY 133, 144 (2015).
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Figure 2:
Washington*
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*Reprinted from: David Weisburd et al., Understandingand
ControllingHot Spots of Crime: The Importance of Formal and
Informal Social Controls, 15 PREVENTION SCI. 31, 35 (2013).

661]

FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN PROACTIVE POLICING

689

Figure 3: Street-by-Street Variability in Crime Trends in Southern
Seattle, Washington*

*Reprinted from: DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., THE CRIMINOLOGY OF PLACE:
STREET SEGMENTS AND OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE CRIME

PROBLEM 73 (2012).

